Introduction
The fundamental premise of this paper is that efficiency wages and retention standards are related. Whilst the majority of efficiency wage literature has concentrated on imperfect monitoring of effort, we leave monitoring technologies aside and focus instead on the underlying output required by the firm; that is, the minimum standard a worker must deliver to continue his employment relationship with the firm. If wages determine effort and effort determines output, and if a firing standard is the critical level of output below which a worker will be fired, then it follows that wages and standards will be related. So, in a world where firms are able to observe worker output but not underlying worker effort, and where output in turn is a function of both luck (i.e. noise) and effort, there must exist a critical level of output below which the worker cannot possibly be exerting the required effort. We take this critical level to be the dividing line between a worker's retention and dismissal. If the worker's output falls short of this standard then he is fired; if it equals or exceeds the standard then he is retained and paid the going wage at the firm. We will show that the higher the wage, the higher the equilibrium level of effort and the higher the standard required of workers.
The central tenet of efficiency wage theory is that wages and effort are positively
correlated. In what follows we present a stochastic shirking model in which the robustness of this relationship is tested. If standards, effort and detection probabilities are interdependent then a sufficiently low standard will ensure that all workers are retained, albeit at low wages and effort. The higher the standard, the higher the implied effort and the higher the risk of being detected as a shirker. By relaxing the literature's common assumption of exogenous shirking detection probabilities that do not depend on supply side effort and considering instead the more general and endogenous case in which shirking detection depends upon worker effort, we show that the positive supply-side relationship between efficiency wages 3 and effort is no longer guaranteed. 1 Such a failure may arise when both the cost of effort and the probability of detection are positively correlated with effort but where the former (latter)
is positively (negatively) correlated to the wage. This result echoes findings in the monitoring literature and is potentially troubling for efficiency wage theory. However, we demonstrate that in our case this is purely a supply side issue. For when we consider the demand-side we find the efficiency wage being set in a region where the elasticity of the detection probability with respect to effort is less than unity, implying that in equilibrium effort does indeed depend positively on the wage.
Conventional efficiency wage theory has traditionally modelled worker effort as the outcome of binary choice decision; workers either shirk by supplying zero effort or they work by exerting the required level of effort. We take a broader view and model effort as a continuum that can be exerted whether working or shirking. Shirking in our context is interpreted as a neglection of duty by underperforming relative to a required effort level. It encompasses both the conventional zero effort view as well as more general cases of underexertion in relation to the firm's effort norm. 2 Our model is therefore closely related to those of Allgulin and Ellingsen (2002) , Walsh (1999) and Strobl and Walsh (2007) , who also assume continuous effort. 3 By so doing, these authors demonstrate that the trade-off between monitoring and wages found in the binary effort dual labour market models of Bulow and Summers (1986) does not automatically transfer to the case where effort is continuous. 4 We differ from these authors, however, by concentrating on standards rather than monitoring.
1 Our paper is therefore novel in that it is the first to concentrate on endogenising detection probabilities through supply side effort effects. This sets it apart from papers that follow the tradition where demand side monitoring endogenises the risk of layoffs. Papers in the latter tradition, that study the demand side effect and the link between supervision, wages and effort, include amongst others Bujdakova (2008) , Goerke (2001) Groshen and Krueger (1990) and Kruse (1992) . 2 Our focus is on standards rather than the psychological norms discussed in relation to unemployment and the labour market by Akerlof (1980) and Clark (2003) . 3 Other authors who have considered variable effort levels include Goerke (2000) , Pisauro (1991) and Strand (2003) . 4 Hahm and Mayer (2011) show in a model of efficiency wages and search that even when effort is binary it is possible that monitoring (or detection rates) and wages are not necessarily substitutes.
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This approach opens up a new series of results linking standards to effort levels and the probability of detection. Thus, we will demonstrate that shirking declines when standards are raised. Intuitively, higher standards increase the probability of detection for a given level of effort. As a result, shirkers, who optimise in their trade-off between the cost of effort and the risk of being identified, increase their effort in response to the increase in detection probability.
A Green and Stokey (1982) . Our paper therefore does not follow the tournament route but is more akin to the literature on standards or thresholds as part of incentive schemes. Although these have been typically ignored in the efficiency wage literature, they have a long tradition elsewhere. For instance, an early exposition by Mirrlees (1974) investigates how it might be optimal to punish agents who do not reach a given performance threshold. There is also a growing literature relating to bonuses, emanating from Healy (1985) , in which CEO's seek to shift 5 earnings (output performance) to later periods whenever performance exceeds an upper threshold. 5 It is apparent from the above discussion that whether relative or absolute performance is the chosen measurement criteria for dismissal depends on the nature of shocks and the underlying economic reasoning. However, it is not the whole story since legal frameworks and employment law may also play important roles. There are varying limitations across different judicial regions on when you can fire workers -see, for instance, Blau and Kahn (1999) for a discussion of employment-protection legislation that makes it costly or difficult for employers to terminate jobs without cause. If such legislation is enforced and absolute standards of performance are used in court or in industrial tribunals, then these legal restrictions may suggest that absolute standards in firing may be more appropriate than relative performance criteria to determine dismissals. Thus, absolute performance measures may be particularly applicable to legal jurisdictions with extensive employment protection, such as the original member countries of the European Union. The legal argument for absolute performance may apply to a lesser extent in the United States where the general rule is that firms have the right to fire at will, although even here unjust firing laws exists.
We proceed in Section 2 to develop a model which maintains an absolute standard of acceptable worker related output, below which workers are fired, to investigate the interdependent effects of standards, effort, wages and the probability of shirker detection. In Section 3 we conclude.
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The Model
We present an efficiency wage model in the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) tradition that is extended to include a stochastic element. We consider the case where the firm observes worker output but where output is a function of both worker effort and an idiosyncratic stochastic shock. Workers are retained and paid the efficiency wage providing their observed output does not fall below a defined standard.
Workers are identical, risk neutral and endowed with a separable utility function, 
The problem facing the firm is that whilst it is able to observe worker output, it is unable to observe either worker effort, e, or 'luck', i  . Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to assume that in some instances effort can be partially deduced. To reflect this, consider the case where the firm sets a 'standard'; that is, a minimum level of output, y , that the worker must attain in order to be retained in the workplace. We define a critical realisation of the random shock,  , below which shirking (i.e. supplying less than required effort) will always be detected.
Formally, we assume:
where e  denotes the firm's choice level of effort and ee   denotes any 'shirking' level of effort. Thus, the worst case scenario when the worker supplies the firm's desired level of effort in the least favourable state of nature defines implicitly a critical state of nature at which anything less than required effort will be detected. The critical state therefore satisfies:
It is apparent that the critical state is increasing in the firm's desired level of effort and decreasing in shirking effort: Assuming no Type-2 errors on the part of the firm such that only shirking workers are fired, then the probability of a shirker being detected and fired is given by:
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In contrast to the conventional efficiency wage story, this probability is determined endogenously by the equilibrium level of effort. Indeed, we derive: 
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QED
As Proposition 1 states and Figure 2 illustrates, the probability of detecting (and thus dismissing) a shirker increases with equilibrium effort since this raises the critical shift parameter, leaving the transgressor less states in which to hide. That is, workers who raise their effort level to the gratification of firms do so to the detriment of potential shirkers who are more readily identifiable. Proposition 1 is thus in sharp contrast to previous literature in which effort and detection probabilities are unrelated. 8 As equilibrium effort effectively determines the critical dismissal-retention output, y , we can also draw inferences between standards and the probability of detection. Thus, within an efficiency wage framework we find that increasing standards increases the probability of detection. This echoes the findings of Rasmusen and Zenger (1990) who, using a teamwork model of agency in the Holmstrom (1982) tradition, demonstrate that the probability of detecting shirking increases with the output target set.
The expected utility from shirking, which is detected only if   , is given by:
It can be shown that shirking workers will never provide zero effort. To be sure:
A shirking worker will operate in the region
See Appendix.
If the probability of detecting shirking is endogenous then it follows that shirkers will not necessarily exert zero effort, as is commonly assumed in the efficiency wage literature.
Whilst shirkers by definition exert less effort than that required by the firm, they trade off the cost of effort against the reduction in the detection probability and do best by exerting at least some effort.
Note that if the standard is set sufficiently high, or the wage sufficiently low, then all (identical) workers will shirk -in the sense that they fail to provide the level of effort consistent with always attaining the standard set by the firm. They then will all run the risk of being fired. In this case we note: 
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The conventional efficiency wage result that wages and effort are positively correlated is retained. Higher wages increase the fear of dismissal and induce shirkers to raise effort, albeit not necessarily to the required standard.
We are now able to draw inferences as regards how shirkers react to standards within the firm and outside opportunities. 
QED.
Proposition 4 reflects the considerations a potential shirker makes with respect to the possibility of being detected and fired, and so forfeiting wages in exchange for 14 unemployment utility. Increasing the standard, y (i.e. raising the required non-shirking effort level e  ), as in part (a), is equivalent to the firm becoming less tolerant as regards low output.
Thus, the probability of being detected is effectively increased as result of the firm's higher standards. To countervail this effect, the shirker responds by increasing effort. The penalty of being detected is simply the difference between the wage if employed and unemployment utility if fired. Any increase in the latter, as in part (b), will have an adverse effect on effort.
This is a common result in the traditional shirking literature, where typically no one shirks in equilibrium. The novel aspect here is that this result translates into a situation where some or all workers shirk.
Consider now the worker's decision problem over effort vis. supplying the effort 
where: Clearly, there will either be an interior or corner solution to this maximisation problem. If the former, then the worker's optimal choice of effort, , is derived implicitly from the first order condition: 
Intuitively, a potential shirker will provide effort up to the point at which the marginal benefit from so doing, namely the reduction in the probability of losing the rent of wages over unemployment insurance, equals the marginal cost of increasing effort.
Given the probability of detection, the supply of effort from non-shirking workers will be determined by an incentive compatible 'non-shirking constraint' (NSC). This specifies the lowest wage a worker will accept in return for supplying a given level of effort or, equivalently, the maximum effort supplied for a given wage. Intuitively, workers will provide the firm's required level of effort, e  , if the expected utility from so doing is at least as great as that from shirking. The NSC is thus:
Satisfaction of the NSC implies an incentive compatible (i.e. efficiency) wage schedule:
The efficiency wage, w  , is the lowest wage compatible with the provision of a given level of non-shirking effort e  (i.e. the standard y ). It is increasing in the worker's outside unemployment opportunity, b, and effort cost,   . c , since the firm will have to pay more to induce effort when alternative employment prospects are good and when the supply of effort is more onerous. In contrast, the wage is decreasing in the probability of detection, with workers becoming more wary of shirking as the risk of detection increases. Higher detection probabilities thus shade the necessary effort-inducing wage that the firm is obliged to offer.
Since both the cost of effort and the probability of detection are positively correlated with effort but oppositely (i.e. cost of effort -positively; probability of detection -negatively) correlated with the wage, a new complexity has arisen whereby the relationship between the incentive compatible wage and effort is not unambiguously positive. To be sure: Proposition 5 illustrates a potential fissure in the positive link between efficiency wages and effort. Only by constraining the effect of effort on the probability of detection to be relatively small as compared to the effect of effort on the worker's cost (i.e. disutility of effort), are we able to retain the intuitively attractive positive correlation between the supply of effort and wages. This condition resembles those in Walsh (1999) and Strobl and Walsh (2007) , both of whom find that whether wages are positively or negatively related to the level of monitoring depends critically on the shape of the worker's effort supply curve and, in particular, whether the elasticity of the worker's disutility of effort is increasing or decreasing in effort.
Proposition 5 in isolation raises concerns over the central efficiency wage tenet of a positive correlation between wages and effort.
The concern deepens when, in a similar manner, we draw conclusions regarding the level of effort exertion and changes in unemployment insurance: 
Proof:
The proof follows the proof of Proposition 5 closely and is therefore omitted.
QED.
Thus, and contrary to previous efficiency literature, we are no longer certain that higher unemployment insurance results in lower effort.
We now turn to the firm's behaviour when it sets standards at such a level that no workers shirk in equilibrium. The analysis surrounding Propositions 5 and 6 is supply driven; rather than tying down a particular wage-effort combination, it investigated an incentive compatible locus of wage and effort combinations. To identify the equilibrium level of effort and the efficient wage from this locus, we turn to the demand side where the firm maximises profits subject to workers behaving according to their previously determined supply (i.e. payeffort) schedule. Thus, armed with the knowledge of how workers respond in terms of effort to changes in pay, the firm will set the level of compensation that maximises profit. We now derive:
Final Comments
Our model as it stands illustrates a more nuanced picture regarding wages, effort and standards than previously acknowledged. Shirkers are no longer those workers who provide zero effort. They are instead those who neglect their duties by working less than required and who act rationally in so doing by trading off the cost of effort and the probability of detection.
Thus, they work harder the higher the wage and the higher the standard set by the firm. By assuming continuous effort and endogenous detection, we identify conditions under which higher wages reduce effort whereas higher unemployment insurance increases effort, both of which raise questions regarding the validity of the efficiency wage literature. We nevertheless offer a resolution to this set of two potentially disturbing results as our case is demonstrated to apply only to the supply side. For when we also take the into account demand side it becomes evident that the firm will always choose to to operate in the region where workers respond to higher wages or lower unemployment insurance by increasing effort.
Monitoring technology has been central to large swathes of the efficiency wage literature. And whilst there are good and natural reasons for this, a departure from a focus on monitoring to one where observable output is used as a signal for effort has allowed us to construct a stochastic efficiency wage model within which we can investigate the largely neglected connections between standards and efficiency wages. The model we have proposed is one in which workers face idiosyncratic shocks to their output. As such, it is natural that the firm should use absolute performance criteria when considering firing. Were we to alter this assumption and consider the case where shocks instead are common to all workers, it may be more appropriate to use relative performance measures, with a relatively poor performance by a worker being used as the trigger mechanism resulting in a dismissal. Whilst such 'avoid the drop' tournaments are worthy of further investigation, they have remained unexplored here and are instead left for future research.
